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PREFACE 
One of the themes of IIASA's research is the global transition, the 
paths the world might follow over the next century to reach a system that 
will provide for the needs of about ten billion persons in a sustainable, 
equitable, and resilient way. 'Rus short paper offers striking confirmation 
of the extent to which current generations are important actors in this 
transition. It is the product of a collaboration between Jesse Ausubel, 
who works in the Resources and Environment (REN) Area on issues 
related to global climatic change, and Michael Stoto, statistician and 
demographer worklng with the Risk Group and the System and Decision 
Sciences (SDS) Area. 
ABSTRACT 
Attitudes toward societal planning horizons may assume that there is 
relatively little overlap between the population of today and the popula- 
tion of the future. To test this assumption a rough calculation is made of 
how many people who are alive today will be alive 50 years hence. The cal- 
culation is made on the basis of 3 age cohorts for a sample of 10 countries 
from 8 demographic categories. While the result is uncertain because of 
changing mortality, poor data, etc.,  the authors believe it is reasonably 
robust. About forty percent of those alive today will be alive in 50 years. 
This proportion includes 550 million people 15 or  older. These results 
suggest that long p1amm.g horizons are rational from the point of view of 
the self-interest of the existing population. Further research into societal 
planning horizons would be useful. 
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INTRODUrnON 
In discussions of long-term environmental issues, such as carbon 
dioxide and global climatic change, reference is often made to the impro- 
bability of substantial societal action to protect populations of the future. 
Most government and business planning decisions are oriented toward the 
next quarter or the next year, not towards half a century from now, when 
many experts contend dramatic climatic shifts will be taking place. 
Indeed, "long-range" planning rarely extends more than five years ahead. 
Of course, there are sxnificant exceptions. In forestry it has long been 
customary to adopt relatively distant planning horizons. Many public 
works, whether roads, dams, or monuments are  also conceived well 
beyond the needs of today. Nevertheless, it is a commonly held view that 
for many long-term issues preventive or anticipatory actions are unlikely 
compared to adaptive or e z  post reactions. 
Implicit in t h s  view may be an assumption that  the population of 
today is quite distinct from the population of the future. As an exercise 
to test how remote the future is, let us make a rough calculation of how 
many people alive today will be alive fifty years from now. How many peo- 
ple alive today might experience, for example, life on a warmer earth? 
THE CALCULATION 
The method used to make the calculation is simple, intended to give 
answers correct to one or two significant figures. The estimates derived 
should be regarded as convenient reference points, not as state-01-the-art 
demographc projections. 
We make the calculation on the basis of population figures for six 
categories of countries chosen by Keyfitz (1979) that have broadly similar 
characteristics. Withn these categories, we select individual countries 
which represent a large share of the population. The ten selected coun- 
tries total over 60% of the global population. In five of the six categories, 
the population of countries selected represents more than half the 
category total; for Western Europe and Japan it is about o n e - t k d ,  but 
countries in this category are reasonably homogeneous with respect to 
their demography. 
For each country we begin with the population in age groups 0-14, 
15-29, and 30-44, taken from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook 
1978 for the latest available year, whch ranges between 1970 and 1978. 
The population 45 years and over is ignored, because this age group will 
contribute a negligible number of 50 year survivors. The use of three age 
cohorts is sufficient to convey roughly the effect of the differences in ini- 
tial age structure from category to category. Age cohort figures were 
available for eight of the ten countries; for Nlgeria estimates were made 
on the basis of the age distribution of Ghana, whle the figures for China 
are based on those of the Republic of Korea. 
In order to estimate the fraction of the 1975 population that will sur- 
vive 50 years, we used the latest life-table survival rates for females from 
the United Nations Demographic Yearbook 2974. Some of these mortality 
figures (India, USSR) date back to the 1950s. For simplicity, we chose 
survival probabilities to represent central points of the three age cohorts 
analyzed here: from age 10 to age 60, 25 to 75, and 35 to 85. 
These calculations lead to an overall survival fraction !or each of the 
selected countries. For each category, we apply the survival fraction 
from the selected country (or countries) to the category total. We then 
sum the category survivals to provide a rough estimate of the global 
population who were alive in 1975 who should be alive in 2025. 
Before presenting the results, the several sources of bias, error, and 
uncertainty should be mentioned. First, survival rates are not constant, 
and the ones we use probably introduce a downward bias. For example, 
rates of survival in India are h~gher now than they were in the 1950s, and 
life expectancy will likely continue to lengthen. While the 50 year survival 
rates of someone alive in 1975 may be higher than the estimates 
employed for some countries, it is also possible that the rates will stabil- 
ize or even decline. A second likely source of downward bias is the selec- 
tion of survival probabilities for ages 10, 25, and 35, because median age 
in the larger, younger groups is somewhat lower.. In contrast, use of sur- 
vival figures for women, with their generally lower mortality, leads to an 
upward bias. There is an inconsistency between the 1975 population esti- 
mates and the age cohort statistics which come from several years; the 
error here could go either way, depending on whether the cohort figures 
used were for a population larger or smaller than the 1975 level. The 
selection of representative countries and categories can also be a source 
of error.  Finally, the demographic data on which we base our calculations 
may themselves contain error.  
Several of these problems could be controlled through further 
analysis. Ideally, one mlght approach the matter  through an integral like 
L m P ( x )  ( i ( x  + 5 0 ) / Z  ( z I ) d x  
where p ( z )  is the population aged z and L(z) is the life table survivorship 
to  age z. One could use data on five-year age intervals and some approxi- 
mate integral formula to evaluate the overall quantity. In practice, such 
data  would be available for only a few countries. For these countries the 
results of the integral formulation could be compared with the results of 
the more abridged calculation we have made. The comparison might indi- 
cate a bias in our approach. 
However, inadequacies of data and uncertainty associated with 
changing mortality would remain. Thus, more exhaustive analysis may not 
be warranted. Indeed, this exercise may be a good example of where a 
quick calculation can be useful. While more thorough and consistent esti- 
mates a re  possible, we do not thmk that they would qualitatively change 
the results. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the calculation. Let us look at  the 
figures for the first demographic category, the United States and coun- 
tries of British settlement, as an example. In 1975, the population of the 
US was estimated to be 213 million. 51 mdlion were between ages 0 and 
14. 85 out of 97 females age 10 are  expected to live to age 60, so we esti- 
mate that  44 million people from the youngest age cohort will survive 50 
years. There were 57 million Americans between 15 and 29, and 61 out of 
97 females age 25 a r e  expected to live to  age 75, so 35 million a re  pro- 
jected to survive in this group. Of the population between the ages of 30 
and 44, 11 rnillion a r e  projected to survive 50 years. In total, 90 million, 
or  42% of the the 1975 US population of 213 million, a re  projected t o  be 
alive in the year 2025. The survival fraction of 42% for the US is applied to 
the demographic category, so 117 million of the 270 d l i o n  estimated 
1975 population of the US and countries of British settlement a r e  pro- 
jected to  survive 50 years. 
The survival fractions for the six demographic categories range from 
35% in the poor less developed countries to  49% in the hlgher income 
developing countries. The first figure is due primarily to the h g h  mortal- 
ity and relatively flat age structure exhbited by the data used for China. 
The second figure results from a combination of the relatively low mortal- 
ity ra te  and hlgh proportion of chldren under 15 in Brazil and Mexico. 
The category of oil exporters also has a low survival fraction. This is due 
to  the fact that  Nigeria and Indonesia constitute two-thrds of the 
category population and represent the category in our calculation. It is 
interesting tha t  the high income countries have more favorable life 
tables, but because their population is older the 50 year survival fraction 
seems not to  vary among countries as much as one might guess. 

The estimates for China have been made by analogy with the Repub- 
lic of Korea. As a test of the sensitivity of the result to the assumption of 
similarity in the demographrc characteristics of these two countries, we 
made an alternate estimate equating the age distribution of China with 
that of India, that is, with a larger share of population in the youngest age 
group. The survival statistics remained those for the Republic of Korea. 
The result is an increase in the sunrival fraction for China from 45% to 
48% and for the category from 35% to 37%. 
In total, it seems reasonable to expect that about one and a half of 
the roughly tour bilhon people alive in 1975 will be alive in 2025. Ths is 
about 37%; use of the alternate age distribution for China raises the sur- 
vival rate above 38%. 
As a rule of thumb for the next few years, we would propose using 
forty percent for the fraction of the population currently alive who will be 
alive 50 years hence. We choose this primarily because it is a round 
number which does not suggest excessive accuracy and secondarily 
because it reflects some adjustment for the downward biases mentioned 
above . 
Forty percent seems quite a high proportion in relation to the atti- 
tudes to whch we referred at the beginning. Because ol their youth, 
many of these projected survivors have no influence on policy yet. Thus, 
we also make an estimate of the projected survivors now 15 and older. 
This may give a sense of the number of people alive today who will be alive 
50 years hence and who might at  present, or soon, be consciously con- 
cerned about the state of the future world. We choose 15 and older pri- 
marily for convenience. However, 15 seems reasonable as a starting age 
when one considers the quite extensive participation of secondary school 
students in environmental movements or the responsibilities in agricul- 
ture whch young adults often hold. Our estimate 01 the projected sur- 
vivors now 15 and older is roughly 550 million, or about fifteen percent of 
the population alive today. 
Another way to look at the situation is to consider the proportion of 
the future population that is already alive. Taking a range of six to eight 
billion for global population in 50 years time (Keyfitz. 1981), the propor- 
tion of that population which is alive now is about twenty to twenty-five 
percent. 
DISCUSSION 
The results arrived at in t h s  'note may be of most interest as an 
opening to more general consideration of societal plannlng horizons. The 
estimates we have made suggest that a 50-year planning horizon is quite 
rational from the point of view of the self-interest of the exist~ng popula- 
tion. It is noteworthy that such an argument can be made without refer- 
ence to the children yet to be born of those currently alive. Justification 
for long planning horizons is often based o n  the idea that, while much of 
the current population will not be alive in 50 years, they will have children 
who WLU be alive. Of course, there are also rational arguments for short 
planning horizons. For example, decisions which do not entad significant 
irreversibilities should not call for far horizons. If there are pervasive 
and debilitating uncertainties about the future, long-range perspectives 
may also be senseless. 
It would be possible to extend consideration of societal planning hor- 
izons on the basis of the approach here. For example, one could explore 
further the shape of the survival function by calculating the fraction of 
projected survivors over periods of 40 and 60 years. Then, it would be 
interesting to compare the demographic findings with opinion poll data 
and economic and cultural ideas about appropriate planning horizons for 
families, firms, and government. 
The authors would like to thank Nathan Keyfitz and Robert J. Anderson 
for helpful comments. 
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